The Longest Years: New Estimates of Labor Input in England, 1760-1830
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Based on six sets of witnesses' accounts from the North of England and London over the period 1760 to 1830, new estimates of male labor input during the Industrial Revolution are derived. I present a new method of converting witnesses' activities into estimates of labor input, and derive confidence intervals. Working hours increased considerably. Moderate gains in per capita consumption during the Industrial Revolution have to be balanced against this decline in leisure. This adds further weight to pessimistic interpretations: I calculate that consumption per capita, adjusted for changes in leisure, remained essentially unchanged between 1760 and 1830. O ver the last two decades, our view of the Industrial Revolution has changed substantially. Rates of output growth have been revised downwards.
1 Capital inputs probably also grew more slowly than had previously been assumed, with the savings rate doubling over a period of seventy years instead of thirty, as had previously been thought. 2 The new orthodoxy on the Industrial Revolution now emphasizes rapid structural change as the central discontinuity, not an acceleration of productivity or output growth.
3 Numerous authors have challenged this new consensus in recent years, arguing that the underlying figures are fragile, that the methodological assumptions are dubious, and that other pieces of evidence strongly suggest more rapid and widespread productivity growth. 4 Despite these criticisms, this position (often referred to as the "Crafts-Harley" view) largely retains its place as the most likely overall interpretation of the British Industrial Revolution. 5 6 Mokyr, "Industrial Revolution," p. 32. 7 De Vries, "Between Purchasing Power" and "Industrial Revolution." For a view to the contrary, see Clark and Van Der Werf, "Work in Progress?" 8 Crafts, British Economic Growth, p. 82; and Crafts and Harley, "Output Growth, " p. 718 . 9 Crafts, British Economic Growth, p. 114. 10 Feinstein, "Pessimism." 11 Voth, "Time and Work." 12 In particular, there are good reasons to believe that agriculture experienced different patterns of change. Clark and Van der Werf, "Work in Progress?" In this line of research, one important factor has not received much attention-labor input. 6 Calculations of productivity growth during the English Industrial Revolution assume that per capita working hours remained constant, and that the only factors influencing aggregate labor input were population growth and changes in labor-force participation. Recently, though, work on the "industrious revolution" in early modern Europe has underlined the extent to which working hours may have changed over time.
7
Taking this possibility into account is important, since the potential impact is large. N. F. R. Crafts has argued that labor-input growth during the English Industrial Revolution may have been underestimated by as much as 0.2 percent per annum, enough to reduce TFP growth to zero for the period 1760-1800, and to less than half of its estimated value for 1800-1830. 8 Also, changes in working hours may have dominated the influence of other factors on the standard of living.
9 This article presents estimates of annual working hours based on six data sets from London and the North of England, for the period 1760-1830. I derive changes over time, and discuss their statistical significance. These figures for annual hours are combined with recently revised estimates of unemployment, population size, and seasonal employment presented by other authors. The new estimates of labor input are used to adjust living standards for the decline in leisure during the Industrial Revolution.
METHOD AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
In an earlier article, I described how witnesses' accounts can be used to derive estimates of working time.
11 In essence, I exploited the fact that witnesses under oath stated as a matter of course the time and the circumstances-work, play, or other-under which they had occasion to observe an alleged crime. This new method was applied to a data set from London, covering the period 1760-1800. I recalculated productivity growth on the assumption that London was representative of the rest of England. Given the limited geographical scope (and the restricted time period), these calculations were largely illustrative: there is little reason to believe that London was highly representative of the rest of the country. 12 In particular, the most dramatic changes occurred in the North of England, where the rise of new indus- 13 Crafts, British Economic Growth. 14 Schwarz, London. 15 Voth, "Time and Work." 16 The length of the working day cannot be established as the simple difference between the time of starting and stopping work, since workers took lunch (and often tea and breakfast) at their workplaces. Since information on mealtimes is scarce, we must resort to assumptions that are largely ad hoc. This introduces an additional source of uncertainty. See Voth, Time and Work. tries caused massive structural change. 13 London's position, in contrast, has been described as "downstream from industrialization." 14 Comparing the period 1799-1803 with 1749-1763 is also problematic. While both periods contain years of war and peace, of good and bad harvests, and of slumps and vigorous expansions, the Napoleonic wars and the unusually poor harvests at the turn of the century were clearly unusual. In order to determine whether 1800 was an outlier, or part of a broader trend, the data set must be expanded.
There are also methodological questions. By comparing the time of starting and stopping work, and subtracting mealtimes, I derived the number of working hours on an average day. Given the number of workdays in a year, total annual working hours are easily calculated. This "duration-based" method is intuitive and yields sensible estimates. 15 It is nonetheless open to a number of criticisms. First, estimates of the length of the working day are often imprecise, due to the relatively small number of witnesses that were either starting or ending work. Second, assumptions about mealtimes introduce an additional source of error. 16 Third, even the largest of the courtroom data sets that have been collected so far do not contain a sufficient number of observations to determine the number of working days per year directly. Instead, we require additional information about days that might have been holidays (as derived from contemporary calendars etc.), which permit us to determine whether these days saw markedly fewer people engaging in work activities. Fourth, the cascading assumptions needed to construct estimates of the working year compound uncertainties, and make the derivation of confidence intervals much more difficult. Even large differences between two points in time may not indicate a significant shift in actual behavior.
This article attempts to overcome some of these problems. I expand the data set to include observations from the Northern Assize Depositions, covering a substantial part of the North of England. In addition to adding the areas that saw the most dramatic changes in employment patterns, this also has the advantage of increasing the number of witnesses employed in agriculture. Moreover, the period covered now extends to 1830. I derive confidence intervals for our estimates, and present an alternative method of estimating working time on the basis of witness accounts.
The data from witness accounts can be used to estimate the length of the working year more directly than is the case with the "duration-based" method. In sociological studies, for example, study subjects are asked to carry an electronic device that periodically emits a "beep." 17 The subjects then record their activity at that moment. If this occurred randomly throughout the day, and all activities were recorded, calculating the number of hours worked per day would be straightforward: with one-third of all recorded activities classified as work, for example, we could be certain that the average working day is eight hours in length. 18 We may refer to this as a "frequency-based" method.
A similar approach can be used to analyze witness accounts, with two modifications. The number of observations fluctuates through the day (and the week). And witnesses sleep, thus reducing the interval during the day when they can observe a crime and record their own activities. I correct for the first source of bias by reweighting the data. Since every witness has 24 hours per day, a completely random pattern of crime (and a constant probability of becoming a witness and reporting one's own activities) would produce evenly spread observations. But since crime (and the reporting of it) are not in fact random, I increase the weight of observations in periods when the number of reports is unusually low, and decrease it when it is unusually high. 19 Compensating for the effects of sleep is also relatively unproblematic. Since the data set contains information on hours of sleep, we can calculate the period during which witnesses could observe a crime. The reweighted percentage of witnesses engaged in work activities during this period of "exposure" can be converted into an estimate of daily working hours. If, say, we assume eight hours of sleep per day, and we find that during the remaining 16 hours 45 percent of our witnesses performed paid work, then the best guess of daily working hours would be 7 hours and 12 minutes. The same procedure can be applied to annual estimates.
There are obvious advantages to this "frequency-based" procedure. We can derive confidence intervals for our estimates, and we require fewer assumptions. Also, we no longer require educated guesses to calculate the length of mealtimes, and so on. Finally, estimates from the durationbased method can now be checked. I pursue two approaches to calculate confidence intervals. First, I use simple asymptotic theory. By its very nature, however, the data violates some of the normality assumptions necessary for the use of asymptotic distributions: all of our cases are 27 The Northern Circuit contained the counties of Westmoreland, Durham, Northumberland, Cumberland, Derbyshire, the city of York, as well as the North, East, and West Ridings of Yorkshire. The range of cases tried was also fairly similar, ranging from petty larceny to felonies. See PRO Kew, ASSI 45 (Northern Assize Depositions).
28 Note that some of the differences between our date set and the census are caused by the difference in dates. 29 Lee, British Regional Employment Statistics, pt. 2. In table 1, unclassified cases have been excluded. I have therefore also excluded Lee's "N.C." category from calculations. twice a year. 27 Witness accounts were recorded by a scribe in the third person singular. Compared to the Old Bailey records, the lack of verbatim reporting makes the evidence much less colorful; and the lag between crime and trial was, on average, longer. Nonetheless, time-use information is provided in much the same way as in London. There are markedly fewer observations than in the Old Bailey Sessions papers, since there were fewer trials in any one year. In order not to expand unduly the number of years under observation (thus obscuring changes in time use during each period), and to ensure comparability, I collected witnesses' evidence for the same set of years as for the Old Bailey (Table 4) .
To examine potential sampling biases, I compare the occupations named in my data set with the distribution revealed by the census in 1841.
28 For London, for example, the 1841 census suggests that 2.95 percent of the labor force was employed in agriculture. Among the witnesses appearing before the Old Bailey in 1831, 3.5 percent worked in agriculture-a reassuringly small gap.
29 Also, the fact that the census recorded a lower figure at a later date suggests that the true gap might be even smaller, since employment in agriculture as a percentage of the labor force was probably falling in London over time (just as in the rest of England). The discrepancy is somewhat wider when we compare the share of employment in manufacturing. Our 35 Reid ("Decline" and "Weddings") and Hopkins ("Working Hours"), for example, argue that St. Monday did not decline in the Birmingham area before the second half of the nineteenth century. 36 Lee, British Regional Employment Statistics, pt. 2, table 3.36. 37 This is possibly because women were, on the one hand, less likely to be selected as witnesses. On the other hand, being at work increased their social standing and the implied reliability of their accounts. In combination, this leads to similar probabilities of being observed at work. Note that, even if biases such as these exist, our estimates for changes in working time are only affected if the direction and magnitude of the biases changed.
38 Note that, even if the 95-percent confidence intervals overlap, the difference between both estimates can be statistically significantly different with 95-percent probability; we are unlikely to err simultaneously on the high side of the low estimate and the low side of the higher estimate.
39 Note, however, that Clark and Van der Werf ("Work in Progress?") find relatively long hours in agriculture, where many expect a strongly seasonal pattern of employment and hence a limited length of the overall working year. 40 It would, however, reduce comparability with later estimates. Note that the results for London are only marginally affected by restricting the data set to males only. 37 The standard errors in the London data are also very similar, whereas the ones in the North are uniformly larger, driven by the much smaller number of observations. What, then, is the statistical significance of our results? Table 6 gives upper and lower bounds for our estimates, as well as confidence intervals for the shift over time. Hours in 1800 and in 1830 are unambiguously higher than in 1760; for the period 1800-1830, I cannot prove that there is a statistically significant difference.
38
This suggests that the long hours earlier found for 1800 are not the result of unusual circumstances, such as poor harvests and the extra labor demand generated by the Napoleonic wars. Annual working hours were only marginally higher than those documented in wage books for Britain in 1856. Given that our data refer to numerous workers from sectors where working days were probably shorter than the norm in the factories, the overall average appears relatively high. 39 This may be the result of a certain selection bias in favor of those reporting to work. Note, however, that such a bias would leave the magnitude of changes over time unaffected, as long as the bias did not change between periods. Tables 6 and 7 are the result of excluding all cases that cannot be assigned to a sector. 42 This avoided giving very large weights to a handful of observations during the early hours of the morning. The 95-percent confidence interval for the total increase in annual hours between 1760 and 1830 is rather wide, ranging from 138 to 1,422 hours. This rules out stagnation, but only suggests that labor input grew by something between 4 and 55 percent, with 23 percent the likeliest value. Much of the uncertainty results from the smaller size of the data set in 1830. Given the more tightly estimated shift between 1760 and 1800 (because of the larger data set), this strongly suggests that annual working hours increased substantially.
Disaggregating our estimates by sector is as desirable as it is problematic. We would ideally like to know how long the workyear in agriculture was, if Northern agriculture differed from Southern agriculture, and if hours in manufacturing in London diverged markedly from those in the rest of the country. The data set does not allow us to answer all these questions. The number of observations is a problem throughout. It is compounded if we stratify our data set according to the occupation of witnesses. Table 7 presents estimates for three principal sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and trade and services. 41 In order to deal with the problem of small N, I restricted the number of hours in a day analyzed to 15: only observations between 6 a.m. and 9 p.m. were used to calculate work probability and the weights for adjusting the data as a result of the uneven distribution of observations.
42
The estimates for agriculture are particularly fragile, given that the number of observations ranged from 19 to 25, and that regional disaggregation is not possible. Standard errors are large. Hours appear relatively short in agricul- ture in 1750-a finding that is at variance with both the results from duration-based estimates and those of other researchers. 43 This is balanced by exceptionally long hours in manufacturing. Hours increased in agriculture and in trade and services between 1750 and 1800 (and between 1750 and 1830), but stagnated or declined in manufacturing.
In calculating overall averages from these figures, I use two alternative assumptions. Average 1 uses the number of observations to weight the averages derived for each sector-hence, for example, giving a very small weight to agriculture. The obvious alternative, if we are interested in "national" averages, is to weight the sectoral averages by the proportion of the (male) labor force employed therein. The difference between the two methods is small. Based on Average 1, hours increase by 19.8 percent between 1750 and 1800, and by 21.2 percent between 1750 and 1830. Average 2 suggests increases of 23.4 and 19.8 percent. These results are also very similar to those reported in Table 6 . The direction and magnitudes of change in average hours are relatively robust. Where disaggregation makes a difference is in terms of the standard errors. If we weight errors by the number of observations, the increase in hours is statistically significant at the 90-percent level; if we weight by shares of the labor force, it is not significant at conventional levels. 44 The only exception are the disaggregated estimates when standard errors are weighted by the share of the labor force. 45 Feinstein, "Conjectures." 46 Cited in Feinstein and Thomas, "Plea for Errors, " p. 9. 47 Wrigley et al., English Population History, appendix 9, Not all the results from examining our pooled data set are equally strong. The result that emerges most clearly is the direction of change-we find strong confirmation that hours increased. 44 The magnitude of changes is markedly less robust, even if statistical significance (at the 95-percent level) is attained. Finally, absolute levels appear least certain, since we cannot rule out some sampling biases that may have favored witnesses who were working at the time of the crime.
SOME IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Given the size of the confidence intervals, our new method can offer only tentative conclusions. Our estimates are no more than "controlled conjectures" of labor input. 45 The results apply to males only, and estimated levels may have been distorted by sampling bias. Nonetheless, there are strong methodological reasons to take increasing working hours between 1760 and 1830 into account. As Austin Robinson observed: "there is no reason to regard zero as a closer approximation to the truth than a reasonable guess."
46
Insofar as our estimates offer evidence of a significant shift, the most likely value-an increase of 23 percent-should be used until the estimates presented here are augmented by further data.
Two recent contributions to the literature also need to be considered when estimating of labor input. Until recently, the population figures presented by E. A. Wrigley and Roger Schofield formed the basis of laborinput calculations. These have been improved on the basis of additional data from family reconstitutions. 47 Second, Charles Feinstein has presented estimates of industrial and agricultural unemployment in particular. I combine these with the new data on working hours to derive estimates of changes in total labor input (Table 8) .
Both the demographic estimates and the adjustments for unemployment tend to reduce the growth rate of labor input between 1760 and 1830. Adjusting for changes in the length of the working year leads to a sharp upward revision for the period 1760-1800. Compared to the population-based estimates, our new results suggest a (mild) downward change for the first thirty years of the nineteenth century. For the first seventy years of the Industrial Revolution as a whole, the increasing length of the working year adds 0.38 percent per annum-equivalent to a 40-percent upward revision compared to the unemployment-adjusted figures, and still one-third larger than the estimate based on the growth of the labor force alone. Our figures derived Using real wages in 1851 as an indicator of leisure productivity in earlier years, combined with the rough guess that annual labor input probably increased from 2,500 to 3,000 hours per year, Crafts has argued that per capita income growth from 1760 to 1851 might have been as low as 0.1 percent per annum. 59 The upward movement suggested by witness accounts is somewhat larger than the one assumed by Crafts, and it is concentrated in a shorter period of time. Nonetheless, we find a very similar growth rate to the one inferred by Crafts, albeit for the period 1760-1830.
Better information on time-use in 1850 would clearly be welcome. It is unlikely that labor input changed as radically between 1830 and 1850 as it did between 1760 and 1830. Tranter's educated guess for 1850, which serves as the basis for Crafts's calculations, would suggest a small reduction of workloads compared with 1831.
60 Robin Matthews, Feinstein, and John Oddling-Smee use a figure of 3,185 for 1856, which would imply a slight reduction of per capita labor input between 1831 and 1856. Our findings therefore tend to reinforce the view that gains during the first seventy years of the Industrial Revolution were minimal. Only markedly longer hours enabled the slow increase in per capita material consumption found by Crafts and others. Improvements in living standards do not become visible before the middle of the nineteenth century, when rising consumption and increasing full-time earnings can be observed. Thus, taking leisure lost into account adds further weight to pessimistic interpretations of the course of living standards during the Industrial Revolution.
